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ABSTRACT
Some philosophers believe that when epistemic peers disagree, each has an
obligation to accord the other’s assessment the same weight as her own. I first
make the antecedent of this Equal-Weight View more precise, and then I
motivate the View by describing cases in which it gives the intuitively correct
verdict. Next I introduce some apparent counterexamples – cases of apparent
peer disagreement in which, intuitively, one should not give equal weight to
the other party’s assessment. To defuse these apparent counterexamples, an
advocate of the View might try to explain how they are not genuine cases of peer
disagreement. I examine David Christensen’s and Adam Elga’s explanations and
find them wanting. I then offer a novel explanation, which turns on a distinction
between knowledge from reports and knowledge from direct acquaintance.
Finally, I extend my explanation to provide a handy and satisfying response to
the charge of self-defeat.
1. THE EQUAL-WEIGHT VIEW1
Some philosophers believe that when epistemic peers disagree, each has an
obligation to accord the other’s assessment the same weight as her own. Call this
“the Equal-Weight View.” Recent advocates include Adam Elga (2007), Richard
Feldman (2006), and David Christensen (2007). Elga puts his general view of
disagreement this way:
Your probability in a given disputed claim should equal your prior conditional
probability in that claim. Prior to what? Prior to your thinking through the claim, and
finding out what your advisor thinks of it. Conditional on what? On whatever you have
learned about the circumstances of how you and your advisor have evaluated the claim.
(500, n. 26)
The “prior” here needn’t be temporal priority. Elga clarifies elsewhere (489–90)
that your credence in a disputed claim should equal your conditional probability in
that claim setting aside “your detailed reasoning (and what you know of your friend’s
reasoning) about the disputed issue.” That is, you are meant to conditionalize on
a proper subset of your evidence – a subset which includes what you know of
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the circumstances of disagreement, but excludes the particular contents of your
assessments and any reasoning by which you arrived at them.
Let me now carefully describe a case of peer disagreement, to see what Elga’s
general view of disagreement recommends. Suppose Smith and Jones disagree
about whether p on the basis of some shared body of evidence. Smith learns this
and believes that (prior to the disagreement) she’s as reliable as Jones2 on the issue
given what she’s learned about the circumstances of evaluation. Elga’s view would
say here that Smith’s probability in p should equal her probability in p conditional
on these things she’s learned, setting aside her and Jones’s reasoning on the issue
and the content of their assessments themselves.3 Setting these aside, Elga says,
Smith should think it 50% likely that she’s correct (488), i.e., give Jones’s assessment
the same weight as her own. So, I take it, Elga would agree with the following
conditional as an instance of his general view of disagreement:
(Equal-Weight View) For any subjects Smith and Jones and for any p, if. . .
(Smith Judges) Smith’s credence in p on her evidence E relevant to p is n1, and
(Jones Judges) Jones’s credence in p on E is n2, and
(Disagreement) n1 = n2, and
(Full Disclosure) Smith learns these three things, and
(Peerhood) Smith believes that she’s as reliable as Jones on this issue in the
circumstances of evaluation, excluding the assessments themselves and any reasoning
by which she and Jones arrived at them,4
. . . then Smith should give Jones’s assessment of p on this evidence the same weight as
her own.
Some philosophers have apparently taken this consequent to entail that Smith’s
credence in p on this evidence should be (at least roughly) the average of n1 and
n2.5 For example, Christensen said6 that in cases of peer disagreement one should
“come close to ‘splitting the difference’ ” (203) between the initial assessments.
And –working on an all-or-nothing model of belief and speaking of peers who
take equally firm but opposing stances on the disputed issue – Feldman said that
after full disclosure, “suspension of judgment is called for.” (235) In this paper,
I’ll be concerned with the Equal-Weight View above, and I won’t take a stand on
either Elga’s general view of disagreement or a general difference-splitting rule for
giving equal weight.
2. MOTIVATING THE VIEW
I take it that many people believe the Equal-Weight View (or something like
it) because it delivers intuitively correct verdicts in a wide variety of cases. For
example:
Feldman’s Quad
Suppose that you and I are standing by the window looking out on the quad. We think
we have comparable vision and we know each other to be honest. I seem to see what
looks to me like a person in a blue coat in the middle of the quad. (Assume that this
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is not something odd.) I believe that a person with a blue coat is standing on the quad.
Meanwhile, you seem to see nothing of the kind there. You think that no one is standing
in the middle of the quad. (223)
In this case, you and Feldman consider all and only the same evidence (namely,
the scene before you and any relevant background knowledge). Feldman’s visual
faculties report to him that there is a person in a blue coat in the middle of the quad;
his credence in that proposition on the available evidence is high. Your faculties
report otherwise; your credence in that proposition on the evidence is low. And
you think your faculties are as reliable as Feldman’s. So what should you do in
such a case, after full disclosure? Clearly you should revise your belief to give the
report of your faculties and the report of his equal weight, just as you would do
with disagreeing but equally reliable thermometers, clocks, etc. And so the Equal-
Weight View delivers the right result.
The View also gives the right result in some cases involving a priori calculations.
For example, Elga (492) and Christensen (193) both consider a case in which
friends mentally divide a restaurant check:
Restaurant Check
Suppose that five of us go out to dinner. It’s time to pay the check, so the question we’re
interested in is how much we each owe. We can all see the bill total clearly, we all agree
to give a 20% tip, and we further agree to split the whole cost evenly . . . I do the math
in my head and become highly confident that our shares are $43 each. Meanwhile, my
friend does the math in her head and becomes highly confident that our shares are $45
each. (Christensen, 193)
To differentiate this case from Feldman’s Quad and others crucially involving sense
perception, let’s stipulate not only that all parties can clearly see the check, but that
they all know its total. If we stipulate also that all parties think the disagreement is
between peers, Christensen and Elga think that, after full disclosure, each should
give the other’s assessment the same weight as her own. I agree. Here again the
View issues the right verdict.
I take it that concrete case intuitions like these strongly motivate the Equal-
Weight View. If it weren’t for this intuitive support, arguments for the View – such
as Elga’s Bootstrapping Argument (486–8) – would lose much or all of their
force.
3. APPARENT COUNTEREXAMPLES
It’s not all sunshine for the Equal-Weight View, however: in some cases it
apparently gives the wrong result. Advocates such as Christensen and Elga try
to explain why these apparent counterexamples are merely apparent. I’ll describe
some problematic cases in this section, and in the next I’ll lay out Christensen’s and
Elga’s explanations and say why I find them inadequate. Finally, I’ll offer my own
explanation of these cases, which vindicates the Equal-Weight View.
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First, a problematic variation of Restaurant Check:
Extreme Restaurant Check
Consider an (admittedly unrealistic) variant on the restaurant case, in which my friend
becomes confident that our shares of the check are $450 – quite a bit over the whole
tab. (Christensen, 199)
Intuitively, one shouldn’t significantly alter her initial assessment of the shares in
this case. Christensen and Elga agree. Christensen says, “Here, I think that I need
not significantly reduce my confidence in my $43 answer, or raise my very low
confidence in the $450 answer.” (199) Elga says, “It certainly seems as though you
should be more confident that you are right than that your friend is.” (490–1) But,
they admit, the Equal-Weight View seems to recommend otherwise.
Consider a new case:Dual Introspection. Suppose there’s a region of the brain
responsible for bodily sensations. And suppose you justifiably believe Alex Byrne
when he says “I must have some sort of mechanism. . . for detecting my own
mental states . . . .” (2005) Suppose a trustworthy neuroscientist persuades you that
she has hooked up your brain and introspective mechanism with Jones’s so that
you and Jones now regularly have (at least type-) identical bodily sensations and
equal introspective abilities with respect to these experiences.
This neuroscientist causes you (and thereby Jones) to have complicated bodily
sensations as of fleeting pains, itches, and tickles, and asks you both to report on the
phenomenal character of your experiences. Given your beliefs about the setup and
your long track record, you’re both comfortable issuing reports of the forms “We
are experiencing ____,” and “S/he is experiencing ____,” based on introspection.
Usually, these reports are true. But due to the kaleidoscopic phenomenology of
some of these experiences, occasionally you’re mistaken. You learn this. Jones
proves to be as reliable as you in her introspective abilities, so you count her as
a peer here. You also believe that she’s completely honest.
The two of you are asked to introspect a complicated bodily sensation and assess
the claim that you (the reader) are experiencing pain. You introspect and find a
fleeting sensation that may have been a pain, but then again, perhaps it was just an
oppressive itch. Finally, suppose you and Jones disagree about whether you’re in
pain after full disclosure. It seems that in this case you should give her assessment
equal weight. Perhaps she introspectively got a better look at that elusive sensation
than you did after all.
However, consider a variant case: Extreme Dual Introspection. The setup
is the same, except this time you introspect and (seem to) find fierce pain. Your
credence in the claim that you (the reader) are experiencing pain is therefore
very high. Jones introspects and reports that her credence in this proposition is
low. What should you do? Obviously, you shouldn’t significantly alter your initial
assessment. But the Equal-Weight View seems to recommend otherwise.
An explanation of how its antecedent may not be met in these cases would
snatch the Equal-Weight View from the jaws of the apparent counterexamples.
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Ideally, this explanation would be general enough not to founder on variations
of the problematic cases. Christensen and Elga offer such explanations. I’ll now
describe these and say why I find them unsatisfactory.
4. CHRISTENSEN’S EXPLANATION
Christensen considers Extreme Restaurant Check and offers this explanation:
It is much more likely that she calculated and has not brought common-sense checking
to bear. Now I take it that this sort of common-sense checking is much less liable to
error than mental arithmetic. (201)
Later, Christensen adds:
The real ground for thinking that my friend made the error in the Extreme Restaurant
Case derives from the fact I have evidence that my assessment of the disputed
proposition is supported by an extremely reliable kind of reasoning, but I have no basis
for supposing the same about my friend’s contrary assessment. (201)
The idea seems to be that in this case you come to learn something relevant
about the reasoning you and your friend used to answer the question. You learn
that she probably didn’t use a highly reliable procedure – namely commonsense
checking –which you have reason to believe you did use. Conditional on your
using commonsense checking and your friend’s failing to use it, you shouldn’t
think that she’s as reliable as you on this issue, in which case (Christensen ap-
parently thinks) the Peerhood condition in the antecedent of the Equal-Weight
View is not satisfied. If so, the View doesn’t issue the counterintuitive conciliatory
verdict.
This explanation is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, a motivating insight
behind the Equal-Weight View is that – to avoid being unacceptably arbitrary or
question-begging – each party’s evaluation of the other as peer or non-peer should
be independent of (or “prior to,” as Elga says) the content of the disagreeing
assessments and any reasoning that led to these assessments. As Christensen says,
“I should assess explanations for the disagreement in a way that’s independent
of my reasoning on the matter under dispute.” (199) I find it hard to see how
in Extreme Restaurant Check Christensen’s evidence that his “assessment of the
disputed proposition is supported by an extremely reliable kind of reasoning” is
independent of that reasoning.
By way of explanation, Christensen says, “My grounds for discounting my
friend’s belief are based on considerations about my reasoning, but not on that
reasoning itself.” (201) But it isn’t clear to me that this is so if Christensen’s
ground for discounting his friend’s belief is his evidence that he used commonsense
checking. Presumably, Christensen’s evidence that he used commonsense checking
is first-personal – based on introspection or memory.7 It’s hard to see what
Christensen would be introspecting or remembering, other than his reasoning
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process itself, in which case his evidence that he used commonsense checking
wouldn’t be independent of that reasoning. The reasoning hasn’t been set aside
or bracketed off, it’s been remembered or introspected.8 But if that evidence isn’t
independent of his reasoning, then according to Christensen’s own test, it fails to
support an explanation in terms of his friend’s failure. So by Christensen’s own
standard, this cannot be the explanation of why the Equal-Weight View fails to
apply in this case.
The second reason Christensen’s explanation is unsatisfactory is that it doesn’t
cover variant cases. Suppose you come to know that in fact your friend did use
the same highly reliable procedures you used. In this case, we cannot appeal to any
difference in reasoning procedures to justify the claim that Peerhood (or any other
condition) is not met. And yet even in this variant case, the intuition persists that
we should not accord her (obviously false) assessment equal weight. Christensen’s
explanation does not tell us why this is so.
For instance, stipulate in Extreme Dual Introspection that Jones uses only the
same procedure (namely introspection) as you used to arrive at her judgment, so
you cannot demote her from peerhood for the reason Christensen suggests in
Extreme Restaurant Check. Still, intuitively you shouldn’t accord her assessment
that you are not in pain the same weight as your own assessment that you are in
pain. And so it still seems that the Equal-Weight View delivers counterintuitive
verdicts. If the antecedent of the View actually fails to be met in these cases, we
don’t yet know why.
5. ELGA ’S EXPLANATION
Elga takes care to point out that Peerhood requires conditionalization on the
circumstances of disagreement. Elga then says this: “. . . the circumstances of
disagreement might include such factors as: . . . how absurd each of you finds the
other’s answer.” (490) Later, he adds:
And one circumstance of the split-the-check disagreement is that you are extremely
confident that your advisor’s answer is wrong –much more confident than you are that
your answer is right. Indeed, her answer strikes you as obviously insane. So in order to
apply the equal weight view, we must determine your prior probability that you would
be right, conditional on these circumstances arising. (491)
Elga’s explanation seems to be this: it’s natural to assume that there’s something
about the circumstance of disagreement that should demote your friend from
peerhood, namely the fact that you find her answer insane. Assuming that you
take the prior probability that you would be right conditional on this asymmetry to
be greater than 0.5, Peerhood is not met.
However, variant cases are problematic for Elga’s explanation. If symmetry
is restored – if we stipulate, that is, that your friend also finds your answer
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insane – then, according to Elga, the description of the case doesn’t settle whether
Peerhood is satisfied. Elga considers such a symmetrical case and says that the
Equal-Weight View’s verdict depends on the answer to the question “Conditional
on the two of us disagreeing, and each of us finding the other’s answer to be insane,
do I think that the two of us are equally likely to be right?” If the answer is “yes,”
Elga says, then the View rules that you should be conciliatory. Elga says that he
finds that plausible.
I, however, find that deeply implausible. And so I don’t find Elga’s explanation
satisfactory. I think that in this symmetrical variant of Extreme Restaurant Check,
you should not give your friend’s assessment equal weight even if the answer to
that last question is “yes,” since your friend’s answer is obviously false. Given that,
you shouldn’t significantly alter your assessment, regardless of how she feels about
your answer, and regardless of your track record of disagreement with her. You
are entitled to believe that your friend’s answer is wrong – and therefore not be
conciliatory – come what may. But Elga disagrees.
For similar reasons, Elga’s explanation fares poorly when applied to a variant of
the Extreme Dual Introspection case. Recall that Jones introspects and reports
that she fails to find any pain. You, however, introspect and (seem to) find
fierce, excruciating pain, as though you’ve stepped in an angry bear trap. Suppose
you are both highly confident that the other is wrong, and suppose you have
a track record such that you answer “yes” to the question “Conditional on the
two of us disagreeing and each of us finding the other’s answer insane, do
I think that we’re equally likely to be right?” According to Elga, you should
now significantly weaken – and perhaps even abandon – your belief that you’re
in pain.
But isn’t it obvious that you should not significantly weaken that belief? You
are directly acquainted with fierce, excruciating pain; the pain is staring (slapping?)
you in the face, so to speak. The belief that you’re in pain is certain for you,
and should not be abandoned no matter what you come to think about Jones’s
opinions of your belief, your track record, etc. But then Elga’s explanation
stumbles here. If the Equal-Weight View fails to apply to these cases, we don’t yet
know why.
6. MY EXPLANATION
I’ll now explain why the Equal-Weight View doesn’t issue counterintuitive verdicts
in the extreme cases described above. If my explanation succeeds in those cases on
which Elga’s and Christensen’s explanations founder, then my explanation should
be preferred.
Sometimes we see that p is true by seeing that some other proposition q is
true.9 In those cases, we might say our knowledge that p comes by way of a
report, indication, or representation. Other times, we just see that p is true, directly.
Occasionally – it’s said –we just see that p, with our eyes. Here “just see” is used in
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a literal sense. Looking down, one might say, “I just see that I have hands – there
they are, directly in front of me.” On other occasions we metaphorically just see
that p, without the aid of our eyes. For example, we just see that no prime minister
is a prime number and that 2+2=4. It is this metaphorical sense of the ordinary
English expression “just see” that interests me for the rest of this paper.
In Extreme Restaurant Check, Smith just sees – in the metaphorical sense – that
her friend’s answer is wrong. And in the Extreme Dual Introspection case, Smith
just sees – in that same sense – that she’s in pain. In philosophy-speak, we might
say Smith comes to have knowledge from direct acquaintance in the problematic cases
described above. A relevant piece of evidence is intellectually obvious to Smith;
she has unmediated cognitive access to the truth of a pertinent proposition. Her
knowledge does not rely on any report, indication, or representation.
And that’s why Smith shouldn’t be conciliatory about the proposition in
question on her evidence: her evidence she can just see – call it “immediately
accessible evidence” – includes either her answer or the negation of her friend’s
answer. Via rational intuition, the proposition that it’s not the case that each share of
this check is $450 is part of Smith’s immediately accessible evidence in Extreme
Restaurant Check. Via introspection, the proposition that I am in pain is part of
Smith’s immediately accessible evidence in Extreme Dual Introspection.10 These
are pertinent facts about the situations that Smith appreciates; they have thereby
entered Smith’s cognitive economy.
Given that, in the problematic cases, Smith – sensible person that she is –may
reflect on the state of Jones’s cognitive economy in roughly the following way:
“I just see the truth of a relevant piece of evidence. Jones does as well, or she
doesn’t. If she doesn’t, then I have evidence she lacks, and so Jones Judges isn’t
met. If she does, then either there’s merely apparent disagreement,11 or Jones just
sees the truth of some proposition and yet believes it’s false. If the former, then
Disagreement isn’t met. If the latter, then here in the circumstances of evaluation,
Jones suffers from cognitive malfunction and so is not as reliable as I am on this
issue, even setting aside the particular contents of our answers and any reasoning
that led us to them.”
Full Disclosure and Peerhood require that Smith believe certain things. If
Smith reasons in this sensible and straightforward way, she’ll reject some belief
such that at least one of those conditions isn’t met. If so, the View’s antecedent
won’t be satisfied in the problematic cases above, and so the View won’t issue
counterintuitive conciliatory verdicts. (If Smith doesn’t reason this sensible and
straightforward way, then while the antecedent of the View may be met, the
conciliatory recommendation won’t be counterintuitive.)
Why does the Equal-Weight View give the intuitive verdict in the non-extreme
cases? There, the relevant knowledge Smith gains is knowledge from reports: Smith
doesn’t just see that p but rather receives a report that p from her faculties. Smith
then learns of the disagreeing report of Jones’s faculties. And if someone has
disagreeing reports from two sources she takes to be equally reliable, then ceteris
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paribus she should give them equal weight. This goes for thermometers, clocks,
and – in the case of Feldman’s Quad – visual faculties.
We non-savants enlist a cadre of cognitive faculties for complex calculations,
and we lean heavily on memory. In Restaurant Check, we don’t just see that each
share of the check is $43 (though we do just see that each share of the check isn’t
$450). Rather, our faculties report the answer, after some complicated calculations.
And if I take my faculties to be as reliable as yours, then I should be conciliatory
when I learn of the disagreeing report from your faculties.
In the non-extreme Dual Introspection case, though I am directly acquainted
with pain (if it’s there), its elusiveness prevents a level of attention sufficient to
come to know from this acquaintance that I am in pain. While I just see the pain (if
it’s there), I don’t just see that I am in pain. I judge that I am in pain, but here my
judgment crucially relies on the reports of memory. When I receive the report of
your faculties in the case as described, I should be conciliatory.
Rational intuition and introspection do not merely give us knowledge from
reports. With at least some cases of introspection and rational intuition, there is
no appearance/reality distinction, and so no appearance that reports or represents
reality. Introspection does not merely represent that there is pain, as my visual
experience represents that there is a computer before me. No, by introspecting I
can become directly aware of pain itself, and with sufficient attention I can thereby
just see that I am in pain. Rational intuition does not merely testify that 2+2=4 as
my kindergarten teacher did. No, via rational intuition I can just see that 2+2=4.
And while it would be unacceptably arbitrary to dismiss the report that p from your
friend’s faculties on the basis of the report that not-p from your own faculties (when
you take your faculties to be equally reliable), it is not unacceptably arbitrary to do
so on the basis of not-p when you just see that not-p. In fact, such steadfastness is
called for.
Our ability to just see the truth of propositions distinguishes us from
thermometers, clocks, etc., which merely report, and explains why the Equal-
Weight View does not issue counterintuitive recommendations. By giving such
an explanation, I have vindicated the View from those apparent counterexamples.
And my explanation covers variations of these cases on which Christensen’s and
Elga’s explanations founder. Therefore, my explanation should be preferred. Let
me now vindicate the View from one more objection.
7. SELF -DEFEAT?
Critics have charged that if an adherent of the Equal-Weight View knows of
even one equally informed peer who disbelieves it strongly enough, then giving
the peer’s assessment equal weight will require giving up the View itself. The
critics often graciously volunteer to play the role of the disagreeing peer. So – they
conclude – if the View is true, we shouldn’t believe it. And of course if it’s false we
shouldn’t believe it either.12
332 EP I STEME 2009
A VINDICATION OF THE EQUAL-WEIGHT VIEW
But this objection should not trouble the adherent of the Equal-Weight View,
since the explanation I gave above provides a handy and satisfying response.
There we learned how the antecedent of the Equal-Weight View might not be
satisfied in cases involving knowledge from that unmediated access to the truth of
propositions sometimes afforded by rational intuition. And it’s plausible that the
Equal-Weight View is itself a deliverance of rational intuition. Even Thomas Kelly,
a prominent opponent of the View, admits that “reflection on certain kinds of cases
can make it seem almost trivial or obviously true.” (forthcoming)
With further reflection, I think, one can come to just see the truth of the
View – not only does it seem obvious, but upon further reflection it just is
obvious.13,14 Its non-adherents have, for all their virtues, failed to fully appreciate
this. And if an adherent of the View does just see its truth, its antecedent will not be
satisfied when she reflects on the skeptic’s cognitive economy in the way described
above. If so, the View won’t recommend giving itself up merely because there are
intelligent, informed, and firm disbelievers of the View, and so the View won’t be
self-defeating.
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NOTES
1 For helpful conversations, many thanks to Nathan Ballantyne, David Barnett, David
Christensen, Earl Conee, Tom Crisp, Enrico Grube, Andrew Moon, Tim Pickavance,
and especially Adam Pautz and David Sosa.
2 In this paper, to avoid a cumbersome sentence structure, I intend the admittedly
strained reading of “Smith is as reliable as Jones” that entails that both Smith and
Jones are reliable. I’m not concerned with cases of disagreement in which both




3 For example, if Smith’s credence in p is 0.8 and Jones’s credence is 0.2, the evidence on
which Smith conditionalizes should include those facts, but should of course exclude p
itself or any instance of the schema P(p)= n.
4 Objection: If Smith excludes Jones’s reasoning and her own, then if Smith learns
that her reasoning was fantastic and Jones’s was shabby, the View will deliver a
counterintuitive conciliatory verdict. Response: Before Smith’s evidence is updated,
the View gives the intuitive conciliatory verdict. After the update, if the other antecedent
conditions of the View are met, Peerhood plausibly won’t be, since Smith would
sensibly reason in roughly this way: “Jones knows that her assessment (whatever it
is) was unreasonable (for whatever reason). Yet nevertheless she sticks with it. So,
she suffers from cognitive malfunction and therefore is not as reliable as I am here
in the circumstances of evaluation, even setting aside the particular contents of our
assessments and any reasoning by which we arrived at them.” If Smith doesn’t reason
this way, then while the antecedent of the View may be met, the conciliatory verdict
won’t be counterintuitive.
5 And I suspect some have thought that one’s credence in p on one’s evidence relevant
to p should equal one’s credence in p simpliciter, so Smith’s credence in p simpliciter
should also be (at least roughly) the average of n1 and n2.
6 The past tense in this paragraph is intentional. In light of things they’ve very recently
said and written, I suspect (though I’m not certain) that Christensen and Feldman would
no longer say what they then said on this issue.
7 If that evidence is not first-personal, but based instead on Christensen’s track record,
dispositions, epistemic virtues, etc., then it’s not clear that there is no parallel evidence in
favor of thinking that his friend also used commonsense checking. (Or at least there’s
a problematic case in which there is such evidence.) But in that case we can’t accept
Christensen’s explanation of why Peerhood isn’t met.
8 Clearly, Christensen’s evidence could be independent of the result of his reasoning: his
introspective/memorial evidence need not presuppose that his reasoning was accurate in
the end. I worry that such a narrow principle of independence will license steadfastness
when one should be conciliatory, though I can’t develop that worry here. Peerhood
should require setting aside both one’s answer and any reasoning that delivered it.
9 For example, the forest ranger sees that the forest floor is on fire by seeing that smoke
rises from the treetops.
10 N.b., I’m not claiming that a proposition of the form it seems to me that p or I have the
intuition that p gets into one’s immediately accessible evidence here. Rather, p itself (one’s
answer or the negation of one’s friend’s answer) enters one’s immediately accessible
evidence in these cases.
11 E.g., Jones is honestly misreporting or dishonestly reporting, or Smith has
misunderstood Jones’s report.
12 Plantinga (2000) offers this type of objection.
13 Though not, of course, as obvious as, e.g., that each share of this check isn’t $450 in Extreme
Restaurant Check. Obviousness comes in degrees.
14 Objection: The Equal-Weight View is complicated and obscure, and so not plausibly
a proposition one can just see the truth of. Response: Don’t sell yourself short.
Also, it often happens that a complicated and obscure sentence expresses an obviously
334 EP I STEME 2009
A VINDICATION OF THE EQUAL-WEIGHT VIEW
true proposition. For many of us, this is the case with “Kein Premierminister
ist eine Primzahl.” Likewise with some statements of the Equal-Weight View, I
believe.
Tomas Bogardus is writing his doctoral dissertation on the mind-body problem for
the Philosophy Department of the University of Texas at Austin.
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